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Abstract: To better assess the global impact of the ascendance of emerging
powers brought about by globalization, this paper attempts to provide a
conceptual framework of “interdependent hegemony,” which can serve as
an alternative conceptual tool for analyzing the dynamics between the role
of emerging powers as a counter-hegemonic, socio-political force and the
hegemonic resilience of the existing international order. The paper also
regards the capitalist world economy as a dynamic system which is under
constant changes over time, whereas certain basic features of the system
remain in place. It is argued that despite the rise of emerging powers, the
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functioning of the world economy will always generate inequalities with
positional changes in the stratification of the core-semiperiphery-periphery
structure. In this context, the rise of China as both a recipient and provider
of global production and investment is fundamentally a positive driving
force behind the evolution of the world system.
Keywords: Interdependent hegemony; world system; power transition; new
world order.
\Hegemony" in International Relations: A Critical Perspective
In international relations theory, “hegemony” refers to a particular form
of order featuring material, ideological, cultural, and institutional asym-
metry in favor of a leading state.1 Drawing from Antonio Gramsci’s def-
inition of hegemony,2 the concept was raised by Robert Cox from a
national context to the international realm. He conceptualizes “world
hegemony” as the interplay between national and international patterns of
relationship crossing social, economic, and political configurations.3 To be
more specific, hegemony is an important instrument and mechanism for
understanding how a system or an order maintains stability by looking
at how different interconnected components  such as ideas, material
capacities, institutions, social forces, forms of state, and world orders 
influence the interactions among national and international actors.
1There are three major schools of thought in international relations theory: Realism,
Liberalism and Constructivism. The Realist school that emphasizes the role of hard power
perceives hegemony as the dominance of one leading state over other international actors,
such as the role of the United States as a “hegemonic stabilizer.” The Liberalist school that
emphasizes the role of soft power sees hegemony as embedded in the interactions of each
individual state at the bottom, and in the norms and values of international institutions as
rule-settlers at the top. To the Constructivist school, which acknowledges the roles of both
hard and soft power, hegemony is a dual structure of both material weight and symbolic
value, or a combination of material power and ideas. However, the world systems theory, a
socioeconomic approach to analyzing globalization and state-to-state relations, emphasizes
state-based classes and material forms of hegemony which are shaped and maintained by a
global division of labor that constantly generates and regenerates unequal exchanges.
2Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart,
1971).
3Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations
Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 1981), pp. 126–55.
2 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 4, No. 2
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The prominent case of the United States as a hegemonic power since
the end of World War II should not be overlooked in any serious scholarly
discussion on hegemony. There is a consensus that the construction of the
U.S. hegemony, driven by political and socioeconomic forces, is projected
outwards on a world scale shaping the international order. The U.S. he-
gemony is intended to defend the gross inequalities embedded in the ar-
chitecture of the international order, and to preserve and increase the
tremendous privileges and power this global disparity of wealth has cre-
ated for the United States itself.
As shown in Figure 1, the main components of the post-WWII archi-
tecture under the U.S.-led international order are: (1) a capitalist world
economic structure consisting of the Bretton Woods system, the U.S. dollar
as the dominant global reserve currency, an international trade network, as
well as the capital and market alliance with developing economies; and
(2) a vast political, military, and security network of alliances and part-
nerships that spans major geopolitical regions such as Europe, Asia and
the Middle East. Figure 1 also indicates that the United States has been
willing to function as a “system-guarantor,”
a “public goods provider,” and an “order
stabilizer.”
The U.S. hegemony reached its apogee
upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Even as the United States was working
with Yeltsin’s Russia to deal with the political, economic, and security
aftershocks, an implicit alliance emerged between liberal internationalists
and unilateral neoconservatives, advocating a New Wilsonianism of be-
nevolent U.S. hegemony.4 As Robert Kagan and William Kristol put it,
Fig. 1. Post-WWII Architecture under the U.S.-Led International Order.
Source: Compiled by the authors.
The U.S. hegemony is
key to the post-WWII
international order.
4William Pfaff, “The Question of Hegemony,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 1 (January/
February 2001), p. 221.
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the hegemonic position that the United States enjoyed after the Cold War
must be maintained, because today’s international system is built not
around a balance of power, but around American hegemony. The inter-
national financial institutions were fashioned by Americans and serve
American interests; the international security structures are chiefly a
collection of American-led alliances; what Americans like to call inter-
national “norms” are really reflections of American and West European
principles. They believe that since the relatively benevolent international
circumstances today are the product of U.S. hegemonic influence, any
lessening of that influence will allow others to play a larger part in
shaping the world to suit their needs. States such as China and Russia,
if given the chance, would configure the international system quite
differently.5
The overlapping sovereignties and ever more complex networks,
together with the increasing decentralization of politics, economics, cul-
ture, means of production, finance and communication, have compelled
the United States to create for itself a new form of hegemony called
transnational liberalism.6 The ideological basis of this new U.S. hege-
mony is the market (global marketization and market access), which is
“embedded in and reproduced by a power constituency of liberal states,
international institutions, and what might be called the `circuits of cap-
ital’ themselves.”7 The power basis of the new hegemony has trans-
formed from order/stability (balance of power under the nation-state
structure in a bipolar world) to global liberalism and market economies
(imbalance of power under the transnational structure in a multipolar
global economy).
Critical international relations researchers do not review hegemony
either in Realist or Liberalist terms; neither do they take hegemony for
granted. Rather, they tend to see hegemony as an outcome of diffusion by
international organizations led by institutionalized coalition of powerful
5Robert Kagan and William Kristol, “The Present Danger,” The National Interest, No. 59
(Spring 2000), p. 61.
6John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and Interna-
tional Political Economy (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 164–207.
7Ibid., p. 164.
4 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 4, No. 2
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and wealthy states.8 The most consequential question in the current context
of power transition  notably from established powers to emerging
ones  is to what extent an emerging hegemonic actor is well placed to
shape the world order.
Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among
states. It is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of
production which penetrates into all countries and other subordinated
modes of production. It is also a complex web of international social rela-
tionships which connect the social classes of different countries. Therefore,
world hegemony can be described as a social structure, an economic
structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these
things, but it must be all of the three.9 Framing the neo-Gramscian com-
prehensive concept of hegemony of international relations as a combination
of “structural power” and “super-structural forces,” we can see the limi-
tation of some existing literature that is exclusively centered on China’s
hard structural power in analyzing the rise of the country.
Power Shifts in the Era of \Interdependent Hegemony"
With the gradual erosion of U.S. hegemonic power especially since the 2008
global financial crisis, the ascendance of emerging powers has successfully
penetrated into some global domains in terms of economic competition,
capital accumulation, political and economic influence as well as technical
and material capacities. China, in particular, has been performing out-
standingly with regard to its global share of high-tech manufacturing
commodities, financial competitiveness as well as international aid and
overseas investment. It is thus argued that the world order is entering
an era of interdependent hegemony,10 where the sources feeding and
8Cox, “Social Forces, States andWorld Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”;
and Robert Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,”
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 1983), pp. 162–175.
9Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method,” p. 171.
10“Interdependent hegemony” is a concept proposed by one of the authors. See Li
Xing, “From `Hegemony and World Order’ to `Interdependent Hegemony and World Re-
order,”’ in Steen F. Christensen and Li Xing, eds., Emerging Powers, Emerging Markets,
Emerging Societies: Global Responses (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
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maintaining the areas of structural power and monopoly are no longer
dominated exclusively by the West, but they are increasingly dependent on
the inputs from emerging powers.
Notwithstanding the concept of “hege-
mony” as an important framework to under-
stand and analyze politics and international
relations, “interdependent hegemony” is in-
deed a better concept for describing the exist-
ing world order in transformation or for
visualizing a possible emerging world order.
The concept of “interdependent hegemony”
implies a dialectic process of mutual challenge,
mutual constraint, mutual need, and mutual
accommodation. It symbolizes a dynamic situation in which both the
defenders and challengers of the existing system are intertwined in a con-
stant interactive process of shaping and reshaping the world order.
As Figure 2 indicates, hegemony can be decomposed into many tan-
gible aspects. China and some emerging powers have successfully placed
The world is entering
an era of
interdependent
hegemony due to the
rise of emerging
powers.
Fig. 2. Dimensions of Interdependent Hegemony.
Source: Compiled by the authors.
6 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 4, No. 2
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themselves in a position of power sharing, in terms of economic competi-
tion, capital accumulation, political and economic influence, financial con-
tribution, as well as technical and material capacities. However, China and
other emerging powers are still in a relatively weaker position in the areas
of norm- and value-setting, global governance, cultural and ideological
leadership, and media control.
The concept of “interdependent hegemony” can be deconstructed from
the following six perspectives.
First of all, it is understood as a primarily interactive and dynamic
relationship between China as well as other emerging powers on the one
hand and the existing constellation of the international order on the other. It
is a dual complexity of both “intended consequence” and “unintended
consequence.” The phenomenon of the rise of emerging powers is an
“intended consequence,” in that it is the result of the established powers’
inviting and pushing China and other emerging powers to be integrated
into the capitalist world economy so that they will be confined within the
structural mechanism of global capitalism. The phenomenon is also an
“unintended consequence,” because the economic success of emerging
powers is a powerful challenge to the existing order. Particularly in the case
of China, such an unintended consequence is well observed by Chris Patten,
the last British Governor of Hong Kong, who described the rise of China as
“a threat to Western democracy” and as “the first example of a country
which has done astonishingly well in this international system, but chal-
lenges its basic foundations.”11 It implies a dual complexity in which
China’s success is achieved through its integration into the international
system, while some elements of its success contradict or challenge the basic
norms of the existing world order. In other words, China’s success is putting
the country in a more favorable structural position in the distribution of
global wealth and, at the same time, making it a serious challenger to many
“enduring aspects” and “global arrangement” defined by the core powers
of the existing world order.
Secondly, “interdependent hegemony” indicates the fact that globali-
zation and global capitalism are entering a stage of “varieties of capitalism”
11Vaudine England, “China is a Threat to Democracy,” BBC News, November 23, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7719420.stm.
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in which “capitalist classes” are not only private economic actors but also
states, such as Chinese state-owned enterprises. The effective integration of
state interests and capital accumulation is helping some emerging powers
to win a “war of position”12 by redefining the systems of alliance and
reshaping the terrain and parameters of global social, economic, and po-
litical relations. The so-called “Beijing Consensus” as a “norm diffusion”
from the Chinese success reflects a unique political economy of “state
capitalism.”13 China’s growing global financial role, as exemplified by
the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), is seen as
Beijing’s norm-setting and rule-making leadership in global governance on
the world stage.14 As the AIIB is identified by some as “China’s normative
power in international financial governance,”15 China is clearly in the
process of changing its position from a rule-taker to a rule-maker in the
international system.
Thirdly, “interdependent hegemony” is leading the world into a post-
U.S. hegemony era, in which there will be no hegemonic norms and values
defined by one single country (the United States) or by a core cultural
civilization (the West). China’s economic success is facilitating the accom-
modation and inclusion of multiple alternative norms and values; the so-
called “Chinese model” is opening up opportunities for multiple factors
and alternative explanations regarding mechanisms that enrich and em-
power emerging nations, such as those of mutually dependent relationships
12The notion is derived from Antonio Gramsci, who refers to a slow and protracted
political strategy of ideological struggle that aims to occupy the critical terrain of popular
“common sense.” The concept intends to be distinguished from another notion termed by
Gramsci as “war of maneuver,” which refers to a direct, violent and immediate assault on
the state for achieving political power.
13Li Xing, “Understanding China’s Economic Success: `Embeddedness’ with Chinese
Characteristics,” Asian Culture and History, No. 8 (2016); and Li Xing and Timothy M. Shaw,
“The Political Economy of Chinese State Capitalism,” China and International Relations, Vol. 1,
No. 1 (2013), pp. 88–113.
14Feng Huiyun and He Kai, “Running the AIIB,” China Policy Institute, May 28, 2015,
https://cpianalysis.org/2015/05/28/the-aiib-what-will-china-do-next/.
15Peng Zhongzhou and Keat Tok Sow, “The AIIB and China’s Normative Power in
International Financial Governance Structure,” Chinese Political Science Review, Vol. 1, No. 4
(December 2016), pp 736–753.
8 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 4, No. 2
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between property rights and economic growth, between the rule of law and
market economy, between free currency flow and economic order, and most
importantly, between democracy and development. These norms and
values are increasingly beyond the monopoly of the existing dominant
powers, and are ever more “interdependent”  more open, less rigid, and
non-universal.
Fourthly, “interdependent hegemony” accounts for new counter-heg-
emonic alliances among emerging powers, but these alliances are issue-
based rather than norm-based. Neither China nor other emerging powers
will be able to create a new alternative hegemony, but they will remain a
counter-hegemonic force to promote multilateralism and avoid unilateral
hegemony. Most emerging powers, China in particular, conduct very
pragmatic foreign policy in order to strike a balance between defending
their “national interests” and resisting the hegemon of the existing order.
Beijing has no specific unified global strategy grounded in norms and
principles; rather, it has different tactics and policy approaches to different
global political, economic, and security problems on a case-by-case basis.
Fifthly, “interdependent hegemony”
offers China and other emerging powers a
good opportunity to develop a collective
“positioning” strategy and “balancing” tac-
tics. However, it also illustrates the fact that
China and other emerging powers are not yet
able to form an integrated “historical bloc” as
an independent and homogenous hegemony, for they are in different
competitive or contradictory relationships with the existing powers, and
they have different regional and global influence as well. Besides, there are
still many lingering political and historical problems among emerging
powers, like those between China and India.
Finally, “interdependent hegemony” implies a new type of hegemony
grounded in the expansion of “room for maneuver” and the increase of
“upward mobility” brought about by China and other emerging powers as
a new force for intensifying globalization and interdependence in the world
order. The economic and political relationship between the established and
emerging powers does not mean a repetition of the traditional North-South
dependent affiliation; rather, it exhibits an interdependent and intertwined
The U.S. hegemony
will be shared, but
not replaced, by
emerging powers.
Interdependent Hegemony 9
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relationship between them. The conventional core-semiperiphery-periph-
ery stratification is no longer applicable to the complex relationship be-
tween existing and emerging powers.
Since the relationship between emerging powers and the existing
world order is regarded as being more interdependent than confrontational
under “interdependent hegemony,” the rise of China and other emerging
powers should not be interpreted in the context of the decline of the U.S.
hegemony and the existing world order. On the contrary, it should be
interpreted as a result of those emerging powers’ integration into the
U.S.-led world order and as evidence of the strength and resilience of
the existing liberal order. Indeed, China is becoming a more liberal power,
albeit in its own way, and Beijing is also working with both emerging and
established powers to reform the current world order.
Therefore, it is necessary to adopt a dialectic approach to understand
the current world system, in which patterns of relationship among nation-
states are shaped by the historical evolution of the hegemonic structure, and
with which emerging powers are politically and economically integrated
and embedded. The challenge by emerging powers and the structural
barriers of such challenge can be conceptualized in the framework of “in-
terdependent hegemony” in the capitalist world system. That is to say, the
emerging power phenomenon, together with the limit of its shape of an
alternative hegemony, is a dialectic interaction that demonstrates, on the
one hand, the dynamic and inclusive nature of the capitalist world system
and, on the other hand, the contradictions embedded in the system in the
process of integrating national economies.
Globalization and the transnationalization process is a double-edged
sword presenting both opportunities and challenges to the existing hege-
mon and emerging powers as well. Seen from this perspective, the argu-
ment is that the rise of emerging powers has indeed challenged many
aspects of the existing world order’s functionality, scope, legitimacy, and
authority. However, it has not yet fundamentally changed the structural
power of the existing world order. Structural power refers to “the power to
choose and to shape the structures of the global political economy within
which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises,
and (not least) their professional people have to operate”; and it contains
four interconnected features: the security defense capacity, the control of the
10 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 4, No. 2
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system of production of goods and services, the control of the structure of
finance and credit, and the dominance of knowledge and ideas.16
In the current era of transnational capitalism, it is unimaginable for
China and other emerging powers to establish a new world order with
alternative independent hegemony. Today’s world order seems to demon-
strate two sides of a coin: one marks the return of the historical “great
power rivalry” characterized by conflicts and zero-sum power competition,
yet the other features “interdependent hegemony” characterized by the
system’s resilient capacity for accommodation and integration of new
powers.
China’s Rise in the Capitalist World System
The world systems theory developed by Immanuel Wallerstein17 provides a
broad theoretical perspective to understand historical evolutions and
transformations involved in the rise of the modern capitalist world system.
This system evolved and expanded over a long span of time and uninter-
ruptedly brought different parts of the world under its law of value and
division of labor. A perpetual inequality in the international division of
labor is leading to a permanent condition of economic core-peripheral
relations. Under this single division of labor within one single world
market, a political structure consisting of sovereign states and multiple
cultural entities interacts within the framework of an interstate system. The
world system is conceptualized as a dynamic one in which changing
positions within the system’s structural morphology is possible by taking
advantage of global capital mobility and relocation of production.
16Susan Strange “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” International Organization,
Vol. 41, No. 4 (Autumn 1987), p. 565.
17Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World-Capitalist System:
Concepts for Comparative Analysis,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 16, No. 4
(September 1974), pp. 387–415; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Rise of East Asia, or
The World-System in the Twenty-First Century,” keynote address at the Symposium on
“Perspective of the Capitalist World-System in the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century,
Institute of International Studies, Meiji Gakuin University, January 23-24, 1997, http://www.
binghamton.edu/fbc/archive/iwrise.htm; and Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis:
An Introduction (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004).
Interdependent Hegemony 11
C
hi
na
 Q
 o
f 
In
t' 
l S
tr
at
eg
ic
 S
tu
d 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 w
w
w
.w
or
ld
sc
ie
nt
if
ic
.c
om
by
 1
94
.1
57
.3
7.
14
 o
n 
10
/0
9/
18
. R
e-
us
e 
an
d 
di
st
ri
bu
tio
n 
is
 s
tr
ic
tly
 n
ot
 p
er
m
itt
ed
, e
xc
ep
t f
or
 O
pe
n 
A
cc
es
s 
ar
tic
le
s.
Historically, the division of labor within the capitalist world economy
brought about and resulted in flows of commodities, labor, and capital
across different geographical areas through chains of production, exchange,
and investment. In this sense, China and India are seen as the last reserves,
or unexploited areas, that have been brought into the capitalist world
system.18 The world systems theory attempts to explain the system’s em-
bedded inequalities in which nation-states occupy different market posi-
tions and have quite different development stages within a seemingly
unified global economy. In line with this theory, different positions in the
international division of labor and the continuous change of patterns of
competition and competitiveness planted the system from the very begin-
ning with inherent contradictions.
Figure 3 shows that the capitalist world
system’s fundamental features are character-
ized by a series of cyclical rhythms, that is,
economic prosperity or crisis, and upward or
downward mobility. More importantly, this
series of cyclical rhythms was followed by the
rise and decline of new guarantors (new
hegemons), and each one had its own unique
pattern of control. Likewise, the current phe-
nomenon of emerging powers in general and
the rise of China in particular can be perceived as part of the system’s
rhythmic cycles in upward mobility, and China continues to follow the
essential features of the world capitalist system. Thus, China is believed to
be motivated or driven to act as a new political and economic system-
guarantor due to its economic integration and market dependence in the
system’s mode of production and capital accumulation.
Nevertheless, emerging powers like China are also described as chal-
lengers to the system’s existing dominant guarantor and other core powers,
because they have different political and economic governing cultures.
According to Realism, China has a strong interest in fostering a world order
with “Chinese characteristics.” However, seen from the world-system
perspective, even if the future world order were to be injected with Chinese
18Li Minqi, The Rise of China and The Demise of The Capitalist World Economy (New York:
Pluto Press, 2008).
The capitalist world
system was shaped
with inherent
inequalities for
developing
countries.
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characteristics, it would simply be an externalization of China’s internal
economic, political, and cultural features without altering the fundamental
architecture of the world capitalist system.
Contrary to Realists’ pessimistic views that the existing dominant
power (the United States and the West in general) and the challenging
power like China are doomed to lasting clash, the world systems theory
does not regard the rise of new guarantors (later-comers) as a threat as long
as the system’s fundamental law of value, especially the mode of produc-
tion and capital accumulation, is maintained. This is because the advance of
the late-comers hugely benefited from their integration into the interna-
tional division of labor and active participation in the process of capital and
wealth accumulation. Accordingly, the rise of China and emerging powers
is understood as part of the never-ending cyclical rhythms of the system,
which symbolizes the strength and success of the world system in bringing
more untapped parts of the world under the influence of capitalism without
changing the fundamental relations of inequality within the system.
Therefore, the world systems theory’s logical argument is clear with
regard to China’s global rise: whilst China is successfully moving toward
Fig. 3. The Rise of China and Emerging Powers from the World-System Perspective.
Source: Compiled by the authors.
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the core, it still needs the periphery, and even more so. The rise of China will
eventually generate “promotion by invitation” and bring about the en-
largement of “room for maneuver” and “upward mobility” for the global
periphery that is tempted to “seize the chance.” Here, “promotion by in-
vitation” refers to an upward mobility path enjoyed by a semi-peripheral or
peripheral country, whose geopolitical or geo-economic position is vital
during the period of global power struggles, or whose internal resource and
labor condition is favorable to global capital mobility and production re-
location. This upward mobility is stimulated by the favorable external en-
vironment created by the promotion and invitation of the existing
hegemon, or by a group of core nations, for the sake of their own geopo-
litical and geo-economic interests. In East Asia, Japan and the Newly In-
dustrialized Economies (NICs) are good examples of this type of upward
mobility by external promotion. “Seizing the chance” indicates the internal
capabilities of a developing country to take advantage of a new situation or
condition in the international political economy and to adjust its internal
development mobility accordingly.
By this theory, for capital to move away from the declining sectors into
the profiting sectors, the declining sectors need to be relocated to semi-
peripheral or peripheral countries according to their labor condition and
technological level. As a result, some of these countries will benefit from
global capital mobility and production relocation.
Historically, it was at such pivotal moments that opportunities for
upward mobility within the system were generated and regenerated
through promotion by invitation.19 The United States emerged as a domi-
nant political, economic, and military power in the international system,
and it played a pivotal role in contributing to world economic development
in the post-WWII era. For economic and political reasons, the United States
committed itself to the revival of a liberal international economy, an inter-
national division of labor, and resource and market access that benefited
itself and its allies. The entire role played by the United States since World
War II is theorized by the Realist school as “hegemonic stability” through
providing “public goods.” As a benign hegemon, U.S. leadership during
this period was structural leadership, that is, “the ability to direct the
19Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy.
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overall shape of world political order” based on resources, capital, tech-
nology, military forces and economic power.20
Admittedly, one objective of post-WWII U.S. foreign and economic
policies was to cultivate pro-Washington authoritarian and anti-Commu-
nist regimes in the third world to defeat the Soviet Union. Fearing a pos-
sible Communist expansion in Europe as a result of mass poverty in the
immediate aftermath of World War II, the U.S. government launched the
Marshall Plan to revive the Western European industries. In East Asia,
Washington’s chief concern was also economic revival in key geostrategic
regions like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Under the U.S. protection,
external military threats and the internal danger of communist expansion
were substantially lessened in both Europe and East Asia. The burden of
the allied countries’military expenses was also greatly alleviated by the U.S.
military presence. U.S. military bases were seen to have not only protected
these countries, but also provided them with economic benefits such as
employment. Even now, the withdrawal of U.S. troops and closure of
military bases would be considered as an economic loss.
China’s rapid economic growth over the
past decades is a testament to the positive
spillover effects of the system’s upward mo-
bility and the huge flow of global outward
foreign direct investment (FDI). “Room for
maneuver” refers to the external conditions
for “upward mobility” in the world capitalist
economy that is conducive to internal de-
velopment. Seen from a long historical per-
spective, the global core-semiperiphery-periphery hierarchy defined by the
world systems theory has been a relatively stable structure over centuries.
The system’s rhythmic cycles and the rise or decline of hegemonic powers
provide both upward and downward mobility. As mentioned above, the
post-WWII rise of the United States was a clear example of the strong force
for promoting upward mobility, and so is China since the 2010s. A positive
effect of upward mobility is generated by a combination of external forces
(through “promotion by invitation”) and internal forces (the goal of
20G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of International Leadership,” Political Science
Quarterly, Vol. 111, No. 3 (Fall 1996), pp. 385–403.
China is both a
beneficiary and
contributor to the
capitalist world
system.
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“seizing the chance”). What is interesting about China is that the country
was an initial receiver and later on a contributor of room for maneuver and
upward mobility.
The rise of China, together with its outward capital expansion and ever
more assertive global strategy, seems to represent another rhythmic cycle of
the rise of a new hegemon. It is an opportunity in terms of room for ma-
neuver and upward mobility for some countries, yet a challenge and
downward mobility for others. For example, the China-Brazil trade rela-
tions represent the coexistence of both opportunities and constraints. On
the one hand, Chinese investment in Brazil and Brazil-China trade relations
are becoming more important to Brazil, bringing tangible benefits to the
country in terms of expanding room for “political maneuver” and “com-
modity boom.” On the other hand, the unequal bilateral trade structure,
with China exporting mainly manufactured products and Brazil exporting
primary commodities and raw material, is making Brazil a primary com-
modity-exporter and is seen by some as “deindustrializing Brazil.”21
Conclusion
International scholarship tends to focus on the debates among the different
theoretical schools of international relations in hypothesizing the binary
choice faced by both the existing and emerging powers: the former is en-
deavoring to assimilate the latter into the defined structure and mechanism
of the existing order, while the latter is struggling to benefit from chal-
lenging and changing the system.
This paper takes its point of departure from the neo-Gramscian con-
ceptual category and analytical apparatus centered around the notion of
“hegemony.” It further develops this notion and provides an alternative
framework of “interdependent hegemony” in order to provide a better
understanding of the global impact of the ascendance of emerging powers
brought about by globalization and the transformation of international
relations and the international political economy. This alternative
21Rhys Jenkins, “Is Chinese Competition Causing Deindustrialization in Brazil?”
Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 42, No. 6 (November 2015), pp. 42–63; and Alexis Toribio
Dantas and Elias Marco Khalil Jabbour, “Brazil and China: An Assessment of Recent Trade
Relations,” Economics of Agriculture, Vol. 63, No. 1 (2016), pp. 313–322.
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framework is considered to be a better conceptual tool in analyzing the
dynamic nexus between the role of emerging powers as a counter-hege-
monic socio-political force and the hegemonic resilience of the existing in-
ternational order. The paper also regards the capitalist world economy as a
dynamic system which is under continuous changes, with certain basic
features of the system remaining intact. The geographic expansion of the
capitalist world economy will continue in the foreseeable future. Despite
the rise of China and other emerging powers, the functioning of the world
economy will always generate inequalities with positional changes in the
stratification of the core-semiperiphery-periphery structure. The rise of
China is fundamentally a positive driving force behind the evolution of the
world system as it is both a recipient and provider of global production and
investment.
The relationship between the rise of emerging powers and the existing
order will continue to be based on a dialectic relationship that waxes and
wanes. Rather than move in a predicable direction (either forward or
backward), the dynamic interaction between the rise of emerging powers
and the existing order will continue to be in flux, because a more horizontal
world order brought about by emerging powers’ and especially China’s
global rise offers more space for interaction and competition, generating
both opportunities and challenges. For the time being, there is a multifac-
eted interplay of Realism, Liberalism, altruism, hope and fear between
China and the West. In the years ahead, the rise of China and the principal
powers of the existing world order will have to go through a considerable
period of struggle, adjustment, and tension.
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